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The importance of between-group competition in the social evolution of animal societies is controversial, particularly with respect to 
understanding the origins and maintenance of cooperation in our own species. Among primates, aggressive between-group encoun-
ters are often rare or strikingly absent, a phenomenon that in some species has been ascribed to the presence of collective action 
problems. Here, we report on a series of comparative tests that show that the intensity of between-group contest competition is indeed 
lower in species that experience a collective action problem while controlling for predictions from an “ideal gas” model of animal 
encounters and general species’ ecology. Species that do not succumb to the collective action problem are either cooperative breed-
ers, are characterized by philopatry of the dominant sex, or live in relatively small groups with few individuals of this dominant sex. This 
implies that collective action problems are averted either through shared genes and benefits or a by-product mutualism in which the 
territorial behavior of some privileged individuals is not affected by the behavior of others. We conclude that across the primate taxon, 
the intensity of between-group competition is predominantly constrained by a social dilemma among group members, rather than eco-
logical conditions, and that the collective action problem is thus an important selective pressure in the evolution of primate (including 
human) cooperation and sociality.
Key words: collective action problem, competition, cooperation, ideal gas model, social evolution, territoriality.
IntroductIon
Although the causes and consequences of  competition among 
individual organisms are generally well understood, controversy 
reigns over its evolutionary significance at the level of  groups 
(West et al. 2007; Wilson and Wilson 2007), where effective com-
petition typically requires cooperation among individuals. Thus, 
although some have seen increased competitive ability of  the col-
lective as the root cause of  group-living and social bonds among 
animals (Wrangham 1980), others have argued that between-
group competition at best plays a secondary role (Alexander 1974; 
van Schaik 1996). A  series of  high-profile publications recently 
rekindled this debate by suggesting that intense group selection is 
responsible for human warfare and, thereby, has played a crucial 
role in the evolution of  some of  the unique aspects of  human 
cooperation (Choi and Bowles 2007; Bowles 2009, 2012), a sug-
gestion challenged by others (Langergraber et al. 2011; Tomasello 
et al. 2012; Fry and Söderberg 2013).
In highly social species, ranging from ants (Wilson 1971) to 
humans (Keeley 1996), individuals engage in escalated collec-
tive aggression against conspecifics, sometimes with lethal conse-
quences. According to socioecological theory, such behavior can 
only evolve if  the contested resources are economically defend-
able (Brown 1964; Davies and Houston 1984), which in social 
taxa is directly related to the group’s collective competitive abil-
ity, or resource holding potential (Hölldobler and Lumsden 1980). 
In many group-living animals, effective collective action is read-
ily achieved and a group’s resource holding potential is simply a 
monotonically increasing function of  group size (Hölldobler 1981; 
Mosser and Packer 2009). Among vertebrates, this is typically 
(though not exclusively) true for species that live in cooperatively 
breeding societies in which the selfish interests of  group members 
are highly aligned, either through shared genes (i.e., kin selection: 
Hamilton 1964), shared benefits (e.g., group augmentation: Kokko 
et al. 2001; Kingma et al. 2014), or both (Clutton-Brock 2002). In 
other species, however, the competitive ability of  a group is often 
undermined by the collective action problem (CAP: Olson 1965), 
which emerges whenever collective action creates a public good 
(e.g., a territory) and the selfish interests of  group members are Address correspondence to E.P. Willems. E-mail: e.willems@aim.uzh.ch.
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not highly aligned. In this scenario, natural selection will favor free 
riders over cooperators, as these reap the benefits of  access to the 
good without incurring (their fair share of) the costs of  producing 
it (Hawkes 1992; Nunn and Lewis 2001), thereby subverting group-
level cooperation. Thus, even where ecological conditions are such 
that effective group territoriality would be in each individual’s inter-
est, CAPs may still prevent its manifestation.
Although CAPs have been described in other group-territorial 
species (Heinsohn and Packer 1995; Bonanni et  al. 2010), they 
appear to be particularly prevalent across the primate taxon (van 
Schaik 1996; Nunn 2000; Kitchen and Beehner 2007; Willems 
et  al. 2013) and were indeed first described in human societies 
(Olson 1965). Studies of  several nonhuman primate species have 
shown that CAPs occur in both the context of  territorial adver-
tisement (Kitchen 2004) and defense against intrusions (Nunn and 
Deaner 2004; Harris 2010; Crofoot and Gilby 2012), but whether 
the emergence of  such CAPs also affects the intensity of  between-
group contest experienced by different species remains an open 
question.
In this study, we systematically investigate whether CAPs influ-
ence the intensity of  between-group competition across the primate 
taxon through a comparative analysis of  a sample of  138 group-liv-
ing species. This phylogenetic approach provides an alternative, yet 
complementary view to previous work on animal conflict and coop-
eration, which has overwhelmingly focused on within-species com-
parisons of  the behavioral strategies of  different individuals. Our 
study, in contrast, takes a macroevolutionary perspective and is con-
cerned with detecting species-level patterns of  correlated evolution 
between the intensity of  between-group competition and effective 
within-group cooperation. We operationally define the intensity of  
between-group contest competition in each species as the number 
of  aggressive between-group encounters that a modal group experi-
ences per day and the potential presence of  CAPs as the absence 
of  spontaneous and contagious long-distance vocalizations used to 
advertise territoriality (cf. Nunn 2000).
First, we validate our behavioral proxy for the presence of  CAPs 
by performing a series of  phylogenetic comparisons between the 
socioecology of  species that vocally advertise territoriality and those 
that do not. Both classic socioecological theory on territory eco-
nomics and the CAP hypothesis predict that advertising species are 
more territorial and thus occupy ranges that overlap less. However, 
socioecological theory further expects advertising species to live 
in ranges that are more economically defendable (Brown 1964) 
and to exploit resources that provide a greater incentive to defend 
(Milinski and Parker 1991). In contrast, the CAP hypothesis focuses 
on the distribution of  benefits among group members and predicts 
that territorial advertisement occurs in species in which it either 
1) confers inclusive and/or mutualistic fitness benefits, as is the case 
in cooperatively breeding taxa (Clutton-Brock 2002) and species in 
which the dominant sex is philopatric (Willems et al. 2013), or 2) is 
sustained through by-product benefits and mutualisms in which 
the benefits are highly asymmetrically distributed among group 
members, so that the selfish territorial behavior of  dominants (or 
“privileged individuals”: Nunn 2000) is impervious to free riding 
by subordinates (Gavrilets and Fortunato 2014). This “exploita-
tion of  the great by the small” is most pronounced in small groups 
(Olson 1965) and priority-of-access models indeed confirm that the 
required (dominance-driven) skew in the distribution of  benefits 
decreases with group size (Pandit and van Schaik 2003). Moreover, 
given that the territorial behaviors of  group-living primates usually 
reflect the interest of  the larger, more dominant sex (Cheney 1987; 
Willems et al. 2013), the CAP hypothesis also predicts that advertis-
ing species live in relatively small groups with few individuals of  the 
dominant sex.
Second, having validated our behavioral proxy for the presence 
of  territorial CAPs, we next assess whether the presence of  a CAP 
reduces the intensity of  between-group contest competition across 
species, given that free riders undermine the expression of  ter-
ritorial behavior. We thus hypothesize that the rate of  aggressive 
between-group encounters in advertising species is higher than in 
species that do not advertise. However, we need to control this anal-
ysis for predictions from the “ideal gas” model, a well-established 
null-model of  animal encounter rates (Waser 1976; Hutchinson 
and Waser 2007). This model, derived from the kinetic theory of  
gases, postulates that the collision rate among particles increases 
with their size, relative mobility, and density. In biological terms, 
this translates into the null-expectation that between-group encoun-
ter rates increase with 1)  group spread or size, 2)  average daily 
travel distance relative to the home range area, and 3) the degree of  
home range overlap or population density (Hutchinson and Waser 
2007). In addition, we simultaneously investigate potential differ-
ences in encounter rates due to general aspects of  species’ ecology 
and correct for phylogenetic nonindependence.
MaterIal and Methods
Data collection
We collected information from the literature on the occurrence 
of  territorial advertisement (yes/no), rates of  aggressive between-
group encounters (n/daily activity period), home range overlap (as 
a proportion of  the total range), group size and composition (total 
number of  individuals and the number of  adult males and females), 
day journey length (km), home range size (km2), and dietary com-
position from more than 200 natural primate populations, repre-
senting a total of  138 group-living species. Note that our definition 
of  territorial advertisement as “the presence of  spontaneous and 
contagious long-distance vocalizations between social groups, often 
in the form of  dawn choruses prior to group movement” (Marler 
1968), was slightly more restrictive than the one used in 2 previous 
studies on primate long-distance vocalizations (Nunn 2000; Wich 
and Nunn 2002): in order to ensure that we scored only those long-
distance vocalizations that serve as active (i.e., not in response to 
the perceived presence of, or previous interaction with neighboring 
groups) signals in between-group communication, we additionally 
required a consensus among authors in the taxon-specific litera-
ture on such calls primarily functioning in the context of  territo-
rial advertisement. The absence of  vocal territorial advertisement 
in a species has previously been taken to signify the presence of  a 
CAP among members of  the calling sex in the coordination of  ter-
ritorial behavior (Nunn 2000). Our first set of  analyses sets out to 
validate this interpretation, before we adopt it in our second set of  
analyses to investigate whether territorial CAPs affect the intensity 
of  between-group competition across species.
Intensity of  between-group contest competition was expressed as 
the average number of  aggressive encounters that the modal group 
of  a species experienced per day. For an encounter to qualify as 
aggressive, it had to minimally exhibit one of  the following behav-
iors among individuals of  opposing groups: either an exchange at 
close proximity (depending on species, up to 50 m) of  agonistic 
facial expressions and vocalizations (other than the long-distance 
territorial advertisement call) or agonistic physical interactions such 
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as chases, pushes, hits, or bites. Our rationale is thus that poten-
tial fitness costs of  between-group competition will tend to increase 
across the primate taxon with the frequency of  aggressive encoun-
ters between adjacent mixed-sex groups (Cheney 1992).
Information on day journey length and home range size was 
used to calculate the mobility of  groups within their ranging areas, 
which in nonvolant species equates to the economic defendability 
of  the home range, or D-index (Mitani and Rodman 1979). This 
D-index quantifies the ability to effectively monitor range boundar-
ies and is specified as the ratio of  the average daily path length and 
the diameter of  the (idealized) ranging area. As such, the D-index 
is indifferent to whether exclusive access to the ranging area itself  
(i.e., space) or the critical resources therein (the spatiotemporally 
varying distribution and abundance of  food, shelter, or mating 
opportunities) is defended, which makes it a particularly suited and 
general index to assess the economic feasibility of  any form of  ter-
ritorial defense. Moreover, to gauge the ecological incentive animals 
may have to defend a territory, we looked at the dietary composi-
tion of  focal groups, expressed as the proportion of  leaves in their 
diet. As the degree of  folivory (and thereby the abundance and 
homogeneity of  resource distribution) increases, we assume that 
the incentive for ecological resource defense decreases (Milinski and 
Parker 1991).
Only data from studies on free-ranging, nonprovisioned groups 
were considered, and in addition, we scored the following char-
acteristics at the species level from reviews by Smuts et al. (1987), 
Campbell et  al. (2011), and the “All the World’s Primates” online 
database (Rowe and Myers 2014): activity period (diurnal or noc-
turnal/cathemeral), habitat type (open or wooded), and substrate 
use (arboreal or—at least to some extent—terrestrial). For species 
in our sample represented by multiple populations, we calculated 
averages/medians for continuous/discrete variables, respectively. 
Additional details can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Statistical analyses
To correct for nonindependence among species, we used phylo-
genetic generalized least-squared models (PGLS) for continuous 
response variables (Freckleton et  al. 2002) and generalized esti-
mating equations based on phylogenetically corrected degrees of  
freedom (comparative GEE) for binomial species’ traits (Paradis 
and Claude 2002). A variance covariance matrix was calculated 
using a Bayesian consensus tree obtained from the 10K Trees 
Project (version 3; Arnold et  al. 2010), extended following van 
Woerden et al. (2012), and incorporated into all statistical analy-
ses to model phylogenetic dependency. Where required, response 
and predictor variables were transformed prior to analysis. 
All analyses were conducted in R version 3.0.1 (R Core Team 
2014) using the “caper” (Orme et al. 2012) and “ape” packages 
(Paradis et al. 2004).
results
In our sample of  138 group-living primate species, approxi-
mately 45% (n  =  62) was reported not to use contagious and 
spontaneous long-distance vocalizations to advertise territoriality 
(Supplementary Figure S1), potentially signifying the presence of  
territorial CAPs. Conversely, in some 55% of  species, including all 
cooperative breeders in our sample (n = 21, or 15% of  the total), 
long-distance territorial vocalizations were present.
To validate the absence of  territorial advertisement as a behav-
ioral correlate of  the presence of  CAPs, we first investigated the 
socioecological differences between advertising and nonadvertising 
species. Advertising species were found to have home ranges that 
overlap less (mean ± standard error of  the mean [SEM] = 25.0% 
± 2.74) than those of  nonadvertising species (mean ± SEM = 54.3% 
± 4.00; PGLS: λML = 0.707; RAdj.
2 0 166= . , F1,133 = 27.58, P < 0.0001; 
Figure 1), confirming their more effective range defense. However, 
advertisers did not differ from nonadvertisers in the economic 
defendability of  home ranges (mean ± SEM  =  1.72 ± 0.16 vs. 
1.36 ± 0.14, respectively; PGLS: λML  =  0.900; RAdj.
2 0 007= . , 
F1,125  =  0.068, P  =  0.79), nor in their degree of  folivory (mean 
± SEM  =  0.31 ± 0.03 vs. 0.26 ± 0.03; PGLS: λML  =  0.941; 
RAdj. 8
2 0 00= . , F1,129  =  0.01, P  =  0.94), contrary to expectations 
from classic socioecological theory. On the other hand, advertis-
ing species did live in smaller groups (mean ± SEM = 8.07 ± 0.68 
vs. 39.5 ± 6.1; PGLS: λML  =  0.956; RAdj.
2 0 099= . , F1,134  =  15.89, 
P  <  0.0005) with fewer individuals of  the larger sex (mean 
± SEM  =  1.60 ± 0.11 vs. 5.15 ± 0.77; PGLS: λML  =  0.916; 
RAdj.
2 0 067= . , F1,132  =  10.65, P  <  0.005), consistent with predic-
tions from the CAP hypothesis. No significant differences could be 
ascribed to general species’ ecology: activity period (comparative 
GEE: F1,16.08 < 0.001, P = 0.99), preferred habitat type (compara-
tive GEE: F1,16.08 = 2.10, P = 0.17), or substrate use (comparative 
GEE: F1,16.08 = 0.681, P = 0.42).
It might be objected that these comparisons do not separate true 
collective territorial defense from private actions by a single part-
ner in pair-living species or single males in polygynous groups. To 
exclude public good production (i.e., the effective defense of  space, 
food, shelter, or mating opportunities) as a mere by-product of  such 
selfish, noncollective behaviors by single individuals, we repeated all 
analyses using a subset of  the data that only comprised species in 
which the modal group contains multiple individuals of  the domi-
nant, larger sex (males in 68, and females in 4 out of  72 species) 
and in which, at least on some occasions, more than one of  these 
individuals are simultaneously involved in aggressive between-
group encounters. These analyses corroborated all previous results 
(Supplementary Figure S2), thereby underscoring that CAPs 
become more acute as the number of  individuals of  the dominant 
sex in the modal group increases rather than simply arise when 
more than a single individual of  this sex is present. Overall then, 
findings from this first set of  analyses provide compelling support 
for the interpretation of  the absence of  territorial advertisement as 
evidence for the presence of  a CAP (Nunn 2000) rather than being 
due to any ecological constraints.
Our second set of  analyses thus proceeded to use territorial 
advertisement as a behavioral proxy to investigate whether the 
CAP affects the intensity of  between-group competition across 
species. A PGLS analysis (λML = 0.000; RAdj.
2 0 288= . , F9,69 = 4.50, 
P  <  0.0005; Table  1) confirmed the predicted effect of  territorial 
advertisement (t  =  4.74, P  <  0.0001), with the rate of  aggressive 
encounters being more than 60% higher in advertising (mean ± 
standard error [SE]  =  0.255 ± 0.04 encounters/day) than nonad-
vertising species (mean ± SE  =  0.153 ± 0.03 encounters/day). At 
the same time, the rate of  aggressive between-group encounters 
also followed predictions from the “ideal gas” model, albeit in a 
subtly different way in arboreal and terrestrial species (Table 1). In 
all species, the rate of  aggressive encounters increased with group 
size, relative mobility (t = 3.25, P < 0.005), and home range over-
lap (t = 4.12, P < 0.0005), where the positive effect of  group size 
was less pronounced in terrestrial than arboreal species (t = −2.29, 
P < 0.05). No significant influence of  other general species’ traits 
was detected.
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As in our first set of  analyses, we repeated the second analysis 
using only those species in which the modal group contains multiple 
individuals of  the larger sex that are, at least occasionally, simultane-
ously involved in aggressive between-group encounters. This served to 
exclude species in which territorial defense reflects the selfish, noncol-
lective behaviors of  single individuals. Note that because all of  the 
retained species (n = 39) were diurnal, we no longer included activ-
ity period as a predictor variable. Results from this follow-up analysis 
(Supplementary Table S1) substantiated all findings from the model 
based on all species. Our second set of  analyses thus unequivocally 
shows that the rate of  aggressive between-group encounters is lower 
in species in which a CAP among individuals of  the larger sex occurs 
than in species in which it is absent (or overcome).
dIscussIon
This study has demonstrated that the intensity of  between-group 
competition in social primates is strongly affected by the presence of  
territorial CAPs. Because there is no reason to think primates unique 
among animals living in stable mixed-sex groups, our findings readily 
extend to other social taxa and may also have important repercus-
sions for current debates on the evolutionary origins of  human war-
fare (defined as collective between-group aggression) and altruism.
First, in evaluating a behavioral proxy for the presence of  CAPs 
in primate territorial behavior (i.e., the absence of  vocal territo-
rial advertisement: Nunn 2000), we found that species in which 
Table 1 
The rate  of  aggressive between-group encounters in all species 
in our sample for which data on all predictor variables were 
available (n = 79)
Variable B SE t value P
Intercept −0.121 0.11
Group territorial
 Advertisement 0.249 0.05 4.74 0.0001
Ideal gas model
 Group size 0.098 0.03 3.04 0.0033
 Mobility (D-index) 0.105 0.03 3.25 0.0018
 Overlap 0.210 0.05 4.12 0.0001
Species ecology
 Diet −0.045 0.05 −0.84 0.4018
 Activity period −0.110 0.11 −1.00 0.3225
 Habitat type 0.042 0.08 0.54 0.5882
 Substrate use 0.650 0.27 2.39 0.0120
Interaction group size x substrate use
 Group size × arboreal — — — —
 Group size × terrestrial −0.181 0.08 −2.29 0.0253
In line with predictions from the CAP hypothesis and the “ideal gas” model 
of  animal encounters, the rate of  aggressive between-group encounters is 
higher in advertising species while simultaneously increasing with group size, 
relative mobility, and home range overlap. Moreover, compared with arbo-
real species, the rate of  aggressive encounters in terrestrial species increases 
less steeply with group size. Significant highest-order effects are highlighted in 
bold. λML = 0.000; RAdj.
2 0 288= . , F9,69 = 4.50, P < 0.0005.
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Figure 1
Phylogenetic comparisons to investigate the socioecological differences between advertising and nonadvertising species. Advertising species have lower levels 
of  home range overlap (a) and live in smaller groups (d) with fewer individuals of  the larger, dominant sex (e). No differences in economic defendability (b), 
ecological incentive (c), or general species ecology (f–h) were apparent. This pattern is in line with expectations from the CAP hypothesis and validates Nunn’s 
(2000) previous suggestion that the absence of  territorial advertisement can be interpreted as a behavioral proxy for the presence of  a territorial CAP. ns: 
nonsignificant. **Significant at α = 0.00625 (Bonferroni corrected).
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(collective) territorial advertisement occurs exhibit more effective 
group territoriality than species in which it does not, indicated by 
less home range overlap (Figure 1a), irrespective of  ecological con-
straints such as economic defendability (Figure  1b) or ecological 
incentive (Figure 1c) and in line with the CAP hypothesis. Crucially, 
species in which territorial defense is more effectively maintained, 
either live in groups with a single representative of  the dominant 
sex (in which the public good of  territorial defense is produced as 
a by-product of  selfish, noncollective behaviors), are cooperative 
breeders, or live in smaller groups (Figure  1d) that contain fewer 
individuals of  the dominant sex (Figure 1e) than species in which 
collective defense breaks down. These results were obtained while 
controlling for potentially confounding effects of  general spe-
cies’ ecology and phylogeny and are conceptually summarized in 
Table 2. We emphasize that, although we did not find any evidence 
for an influence of  ecological constraints on primate territoriality 
between species, this does not exclude the possibility that local ecol-
ogy affects the expression of  territorial behaviors within species. 
Similarly, our findings do not imply that economic defendability of  
resources is not a necessary condition for the evolution and main-
tenance of  territoriality, but merely that in and of  itself, it is not a 
sufficient condition (see also Mitani and Rodman 1979).
Second, while controlling for predictions from an “ideal gas” model 
on expected encounter rates, we established that the rate of  aggressive 
between-group encounters was more than 60% higher in species that 
do not experience CAPs (or in which they are overcome) than in spe-
cies that do (Table 1). Interestingly, we also found that when contrasted 
against arboreal species, the rate of  aggressive encounters in terrestrial 
taxa increased relatively less steeply with group size. This most plau-
sibly reflects the fact that arboreal species live in much smaller groups 
than terrestrial species (median  =  8.00 vs. 38.38, respectively), such 
that an equal absolute increase in group size, will have a relatively 
larger impact on the probability of  encountering neighboring groups 
in the former than in the latter. Taken together, our findings indicate 
that the intensity of  between-group competition in primates is more 
strongly affected by social dilemmas rather than ecological conditions 
and that the CAP is an important selective force in the social evolu-
tion of  all group-living primates.
Overall, we found evidence for the presence of  CAPs in 45% of  
species in our sample, representing all major radiations of  social 
primates (Lemuriformes, Platyrrhini, and Catarrhini). A  distinct 
and anticipated exception to this prevalence of  CAPs in primate 
territoriality are cooperatively breeding species (but note that 
removing these taxa from our main analysis did not change its 
results; Supplementary Table S2). In line with evidence from other 
cooperatively breeding vertebrates (Clutton-Brock 2002), CAPs did 
not affect territoriality in any of  the cooperatively breeding species 
in our sample. This finding, nevertheless, should not be taken to 
suggest that more subtle forms of  free riding cannot exist in these 
species: “weak free riders” do not necessarily undermine the pro-
duction of  a public good but may still procure more than their fair 
share of  the benefits (Heinsohn and Packer 1995; Nunn and Lewis 
2001). The effects of  weak free riding, however, are beyond the 
grain of  analysis of  a broad comparative study as the one presented 
here and would require intraspecific comparisons or dedicated 
experimental work on a focal population or group.
We acknowledge that the behavioral proxy we used for the pres-
ence of  CAPs is not perfect. First, the occurrence of  vocal territorial 
advertisement in a species does not always equate to the absence of  
CAPs in cooperative defense. In certain taxa, the larger, advertising 
sex (typically males) is represented by 1 individual only, and CAPs in 
the context of  territorial advertisement can thus not occur. Yet, dur-
ing territorial disputes over ecological resources such as space, food, 
or shelter, the smaller sex (typically females) may actually be the more 
actively involved sex, so that CAPs in the joint defense aspect of  ter-
ritoriality can still emerge. It is thus important to point out that our 
Table 2 
Conceptual summary of  the main findings of  this study to account for the incidence of  group-territorial behaviors across the 
primate taxon
Group territoriality
No Yes
Territory economics
Undefended home range is ESS Defended territory is ESS
–Economic defendability: not possible to defend (low D-index) –Economic defendability: possible to defend (high D-index)
and/or and
 – Resource abundance and distribution: no incentive to defend 
(high folivory)
 – Resource abundance and distribution: strong incentive to 
defend (low folivory)
CAP
 No
Not expected a. By-product benefit
Not observed    Groups with only 1 individual of  dominant sex
  –No group-level cooperation required
b. Indirect benefit (kin selection)
   Cooperative breeders/philopatry dominant sex
  –Individuals highly related
c. Direct benefit (e.g., group augmentation)
  Cooperative breeders
  –Individual interests highly aligned
 Yes
Suboptimal territorial defense By-product benefit
Large groups, many individuals dominant sex Small groups, few individuals of  dominant sex
  – Low skew in the distribution of  benefits, public good (i.e., 
territory) is not produced
  – High skew in the distribution of  benefits, set of  “privileged 
individuals” produces public good out of  selfish interest
Our analyses did not generate support for classic territory economics theory based on ecological constraints. Instead, we found overwhelming support for the 
view that effective group territoriality provides a public good, the production of  which is prone to the CAP yet can be maintained by either by-product, indirect, 
or direct fitness benefits to individuals. ESS: evolutionarily stable strategy.
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proxy can only inform about the potential presence of  CAPs among 
individuals of  the larger, advertising sex. Second, our proxy implicitly 
assumes that, in principle, long-distance vocalizations can occur in all 
species. Indeed, although long-distance vocalizations are considered 
the ancestral state in primates (Wich and Nunn 2002), not a single 
species in our sample with high fission–fusion dynamics (n = 13) was 
reported to primarily use such calls in the context of  between-group 
communication. Nevertheless, 6 of  these taxa (Pan troglodytes subspp., 
Ateles spp., and Brachyteles arachnoides) are known to be highly group 
territorial and are thought to avert potential CAPs through the 
indirect and/or direct fitness benefits conferred by male philopatry 
and bonding (Widdig 2013; Willems et  al. 2013). If  anything, this 
implies that our proxy could have resulted in overly conservative 
conclusions about the significance of  CAPs in primate territorial-
ity. Removing all fission–fusion species from our analyses, however, 
corroborated all results and conclusions obtained from the full data 
set (Supplementary Table S3). Despite these limitations (which are 
almost inherent to any broad phylogenetic comparison based on 
behavioral data), our first set of  analyses overwhelmingly vindicates 
the previously suggested interpretation of  the presence of  territorial 
advertisement as a biologically informative correlate of  the absence 
of  territorial CAPs (Nunn 2000).
Our findings show that territorial CAPs among group members 
considerably decrease the intensity of  between-group competition, 
strongly suggesting that between-group competition may not be a 
universally important selective force in the evolution of  primate 
sociality and cooperation (see also Crofoot and Gilby 2012). Viewed 
in a multilevel selection framework (Wilson and Wilson 2007), we 
thus observe that within-group, rather than between-group, compe-
tition appears to be the dominant selective force in social primates: 
in fact, our study reveals that intense within-group competition, of  
which the CAP is only one of  many possible manifestations, erodes 
the significance of  group-level selection by undermining effective 
group-level cooperation. As such, our findings are inconsistent 
with an influential model of  primate sociality that postulates that 
individuals in larger groups enjoy a categorical advantage over 
individuals in smaller groups during between-group competition 
situations (Wrangham 1980). The data, in contrast, reveal that col-
lective territoriality is more effectively maintained in species that 
live in smaller groups that contain fewer individuals of  the larger, 
more actively involved, sex (apart from cooperatively breeding and 
male bonded fission–fusion species). These results, moreover, may 
shed light on the evolution of  escalated between-group competition 
and aggression in humans, that is, warfare (Keeley 1996). The only 
nonmonogamous, group-living primates in which individuals of  the 
larger sex are able to mount effective collective territorial action 
are either cooperative breeders or, if  living in large fission–fusion 
groups, male bonded species. In any species where these 2 features 
co-occur, we should therefore expect pronounced collective territo-
riality. Indeed, among primates, this is uniquely the case in humans 
(Blaffer-Hrdy 2009; Hill and Hurtado 2009), and we therefore 
conclude that it is more parsimonious to view the highly coopera-
tive nature of  human societies as an evolutionary precondition for 
warfare (Langergraber et al. 2011; Tomasello et al. 2012; Fry and 
Söderberg 2013) rather than as a consequence of  intense group-
level selection (contra: Choi and Bowles 2007; Bowles 2009, 2012).
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